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Abstract
The liar paradox discloses such a property of the natural language which
renders possible the formulation of a sentence expressing its own falsehood. Ob-
viously the acceptance of such a sentence must result in contradiction. Thus,
the so-called ”solution of the liar paradox” cannot consist solely in the abolition
of paradoxical sentences in question. In opposite, the ”liar sentence” seems to
require some simple and clear formahzation which would $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}$ to treat this sen-
tence as another contradiction. Hence the desired language should contain an
instrument to construct self-referential sentences.
In this paper, an approach to the liar paradox satisfies two, possibly contro-
versial, conditions. The first one is the assumption that the liar paradox is only
a sentential language problem. It implies that there is no need to employ predi-
cates. According to the second assumption, the sentence expressing the paradox
is free from such elements of the language which are not connectives, i.e. there
is no place for such additional components like, for example, an agent. Thus,
the liar paradox is here an “imer” problem of the almost ordinary sentential
language.
The famous paradoxical sentence this sentence is false is here formalised
in such a way that its interpretation is such a contrtautology as, for example,
$p\wedge\neg p$ . The only difference between both kinds of contradictory sentences is that
the latter is expressed only by truthfumctional connectives, while the former one
employs some intentional function.
Finally, we should notice that our approach is not limited to the classical
case only but can be applied for many non-classical logics as well.
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1 The liar sentence
Let us assume that some sentence $p$ is true and false simultaneously.
In other words, we have
$p\wedge\neg p$ . (1)
Clearly, $\neg p$ follows from $p$ and $p$ follows from $\neg p$ , which means that
basing on our assumption we obtain $prightarrow\neg p$ . No one, however, is as-
tonished nor treats thi$s$ situation as a paradoxical one. It is clear that
if we assume some contradictory sentence, its truth is equivalent to its
falsehood, which is a natural and well known fact.
Our approach to the liar paradox will be similar. We shall try to
express the sentence
this sentence is false
in such a way, that it is a simple contradictory sentence. Then, a
fact that the truth of this sentence follows from its falsehood, and vice
versa, will be quite natural.
In the first parts of [7] (see [6] for original Polish version) Tarski
writes:
“
$[\ldots]$ For the sake of greater perspicuity we shall use the symbol “$c$” as
a typographical abbreviation of the expression “ the sentence printed on
this page, line 5 from the top”. Consider now the following sentence:
$c$ is not a true sentence. $[$ ... $]$ ”
Of course, the last sentence above is writen in [7] in the fifth line bom
the top of the page. Following Le\’{s}niewski, Tarski infers a contradiction
from thi$s$ formalization.
Both of our assumptions stated in the abstract follow from Tarski’s
presentation. It is easy to see that neither a predicate nor an agent
are necessary to express the liar sentence. Moreover, Tarski gives some
suggestions for constructing a new connective satisfying our intuitions
of self-referential sentences.
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Let us consider an intentional connective “... says that...”. Prob-
ably the mark of colon “:” would here comply with our intuition the
most as such is its reading in natural language practice. Now, our
$\mathrm{C}$-language (colon-language) is an algebra
$\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{C}}=(\mathrm{L}_{\mathrm{C}}, \neg, \wedge, \mathrm{v}, arrow, rightarrow, :)$ .
Thus, the sentence $p:q$ will be read as “$p$ says that $q$”. It $s$ desired
meaning is that every sentence in the form of the conjunction says
about all of its component$s$ , i.e.
$\alpha_{1}\wedge\ldots\wedge\alpha_{k}$ says that $\alpha_{i}$
for $i=1,$ $\ldots k$ and for any $\alpha_{1},$ $\ldots,$ $\alpha_{k}\in \mathrm{L}_{\mathrm{C}}$ . lf a formula is a conjunction, we
can express this fact by mean$s$ of colon. In other case, colon expresses
only a trivial fact that $\alpha$ is of the form of $\alpha$ .
This meaning will be rendered by the following axiom set for the
colon connective.
Of course, each sentence says what it says
$(\mathrm{A}_{1})$ $\alpha:\alpha$ .
If the first sentence says what the second sentence says and if this
second sentence says what the third sentence says, then obviously the
first sentence says what the third one says
$(\mathrm{A}_{2})$ $((\alpha:\beta)\wedge(\beta:\gamma))arrow(\alpha:\gamma)$ .
The next two axioms formalize some especially natural aspects of
the main idea mentioned above:
(A3) $(\alpha\wedge\beta):\alpha$ ,
$(\mathrm{A}_{4})$ $(\alpha\wedge\beta):(\beta\wedge\alpha)$ .
To repeat the same sentence is to say nothing new
(A5) $\alpha:(\alpha\wedge\alpha)$ .
If one sentence says what the other sentence says and vice versa, it
means that the sentences are identical. So-defined identity is an ax-
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iomatic extention of the Suszko’s identity $”\equiv^{)}$’ extended by two axioms:
$\alpha\equiv(\alpha\wedge\alpha)$ and $(\alpha\wedge\beta)\equiv(\beta\wedge\alpha)$ (e.g. see [1], [5]).
After such a remark, the axioms of the invariance of the colon with
respect to all other connectives seem to be natural
$(\mathrm{A}_{6})$ $((\alpha:\beta)\wedge(\beta:\alpha))arrow((\neg\alpha:\neg\beta)\wedge(\neg\beta:\neg\alpha))$,
$(\mathrm{A}_{8})$ $((\alpha:\beta)\wedge(\beta:\alpha)\wedge(\gamma:\delta)\wedge(\delta:\gamma))arrow(((\alpha\S\gamma):(\beta\S\delta))\wedge((\beta\S\delta):(\alpha\S\gamma)))$
for \S \in $\{arrow, rightarrow,:\}$ .
The only exceptions are the conjunction and disjunction connectives.
Because of the character of colon, we can ass.ume even simpler a con-
dition
$(\mathrm{A}_{7})$ $((\alpha:\beta)\wedge(\gamma:\delta))arrow((\alpha\S\gamma):(\beta\S\delta))$ for \S \in $\{\wedge, \vee\}$ .
The last axiom shows that the colon connective is another stronger
implication
(A9) $(\alpha:\beta)arrow(\alphaarrow\beta)$ .
So-defined connective can extend not only the classical but also,
for example, intuitionistic logic. At first, there will be considered a
semantics for the classical case. A modification of the semantics for
the intuitionistic case is analogous to the one presented in [2].
Because of our philosophical intentions and some relation to Suszko’s
identity, the most natural semantics for logic with colon and for logic
with identity connective should comprise semantic correlates as objects
interpreting sentences. In the classical case, a matrix semantics is given
by models being some modifications of Suszko’s SCI-models (cf. [5]).
Let $A=(\mathrm{A}, -, \cap, \cup, arrow, rightarrow, \triangleright)$ be an algebra similar to $\mathrm{C}$-language. For
any $\mathrm{D}$ a nonempty proper subset of $\mathrm{A}$ , matrix $\mathcal{M}=(A, \mathrm{D})$ will be called
Cc-model (a model for classical logic with colon given by $(\mathrm{A}_{1})-(\mathrm{A}9)$ ), if
for any $a,$ $b\in \mathrm{A}a=a\cap a,$ $a\mathrm{n}b=b\cap a$ and, moreover
(1) $-a\in \mathrm{D}$ iff $a\not\in \mathrm{D}$ ;
(2) $a\cap b\in \mathrm{D}$ iff $a\in \mathrm{D}$ and $b\in \mathrm{D}$ ;
(3) $a\cup b\in \mathrm{D}$ iff $a\in \mathrm{D}$ or $b\in \mathrm{D}$ ;
(4) $aarrow b\in \mathrm{D}$ iff $a\not\in \mathrm{D}$ or $b\in \mathrm{D}$ ;
(5) $a\triangleright b\in \mathrm{D}$ iff $a=b\cap c$ for some $c\in \mathrm{A}$ .
The last condition (5) realizes our earlier accepted assumptions.
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The matrix consequence operation $\mathrm{C}_{\mathcal{M}}$ is defined in a standard way,
i.e. for any $\mathrm{B}\subseteq \mathrm{L}_{\mathrm{C}}$ and for any $\alpha\in \mathrm{L}_{\mathrm{C}}$
$\alpha\in \mathrm{C}_{\Lambda 4}(\mathrm{B})$ iff for any $\mathrm{h}\in \mathrm{H}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(c_{\mathrm{c}},A)$
$\mathrm{h}(\alpha)\in \mathrm{D}$ provided $\mathrm{h}(\beta)\in \mathrm{D}$ for all $\beta\in \mathrm{B}$ .
An easy verification proves the following completeness theorem
$\alpha\in \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{c}}(\mathrm{B})$ iff for any Cc-model $\mathcal{M}\alpha\in \mathrm{C}_{A4}(\mathrm{B})$
for any $\mathrm{B}\subseteq \mathrm{L}$ and for any $\alpha\in \mathrm{L}$ .
A proof of soundness is based upon the fact that $\mathrm{h}((\alpha:\beta)\wedge(\beta:\alpha))\in \mathrm{D}$
implies $\mathrm{h}(\alpha)=\mathrm{h}(\beta)$ . Let us assume an antecedent of this implica-
tion. Then, $\mathrm{h}(\alpha)=\mathrm{h}(\beta)\bigcap_{C}$ and $\mathrm{h}(\beta)=\mathrm{h}(\alpha)\mathrm{n}d$ for some $c,$ $d\in \mathrm{A}$ . Hence,
$\mathrm{h}(\alpha)=\mathrm{h}(\alpha)\cap d\cap c$ and $\mathrm{h}(\beta)=\mathrm{h}(\alpha)\mathrm{n}d\cap c\cap d=\mathrm{h}(\alpha)$ .
For the completeness part of the proof there will be checked the last
(fifth) condition, only. Obviously, for any Cc-theory $\mathrm{T}$ , the relation
$”\sim$” such that $\alpha\sim\beta$ if and only if $(\alpha:\beta)\wedge(\beta:\alpha)\in \mathrm{T}$ , for any $\alpha,\beta\in \mathrm{L}_{\mathrm{C}}$ , is
a congruence of the matrix $(\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{C}},\mathrm{T})$ . The fact that $(\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{C}}/\sim, \mathrm{T}/\sim)$ with a
maximal Cc-theory $\mathrm{T}s$atisfies all “truthfunctional” conditions (1)$-(4)$
is clear. Assume that $[\alpha]_{\sim}\triangleright_{\sim}[\beta]_{\sim}\in \mathrm{T}/\sim$ . Then, $\alpha:\beta\in \mathrm{T}$ and by $(\mathrm{A}_{1})$ ,
$(\mathrm{A}_{2})$ , (A5) and (A7) $\alpha:(\alpha\wedge\beta)\in \mathrm{T}$ . So, $[\alpha]_{\sim}=[\beta]_{\sim\sim}\mathrm{n}[\alpha]\sim$ . Conversely,
suppose that $[\alpha]_{\sim}=[\beta]_{\sim\sim}\mathrm{n}[\gamma]_{\sim^{\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}}}\mathrm{r}\gamma\in \mathrm{L}_{\mathrm{C}}$ . By $(\mathrm{A}_{2})$ and (A3) $\alpha:(\beta\wedge\gamma)\in \mathrm{T}$
implies $\alpha:\beta\in \mathrm{T}$ . Thus, $[\alpha]_{\sim}\triangleright_{\sim}[\beta]_{\sim}\in \mathrm{T}/\sim$ .
Let us consider an additional connective of assertion $\mathrm{Q}$ , given by
axiom
$(\mathrm{A}_{\mathrm{Q}})$ $\alpharightarrow \mathrm{Q}\alpha$ .
Because $\alpha:\mathrm{Q}\alpha$ is not a Cc-tautology, the as$s$ertion $\mathrm{Q}$ is not a trivial
connective, here.
Now, following Tarski’s formulation, we can express the liar paradox
sentence as
$p:\neg \mathrm{Q}p$ . (2)
Easy checking shows that (2) is a contrtautology. In this sense, both
sentences (1) and (2) have the same status with the only difference
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being that (2) contains a non-truthfunctional connective. It is nothing
unusual that the acceptance of (2) yields the situation in which the
truth of the sentence $p$ follows from its falsehood and vice versa-the
formula $(p:\neg \mathrm{Q}p)arrow(prightarrow\neg p)$ is a Cc-tautology. This means that in our
approach, once the sentence $p\wedge\neg p$ is not treated as paradoxical, neither
the liar sentence can be treated as such.
2 The Brouwerian counterpart of colon
Our approach is supposed to be independend from any concrete logic,
therefore the colon is supposed to work on the base of many different
logics. But unfortunately, our new connective cannot be applied in
all, even very similar to the liar, cases. Let us consider two following
sentences which, traditionally, should be treated as paradoxes
this sentence says what it does not say, (3)
this sentence does not say what it says. (4)
Clearly, sentences (3) and (4) have different meanings. Contrary to the
liar sentence, both considered sentences do not deal with a problem of
truth values. A formalization of (3) is obvious, $p:\neg p$ . However, in the
case of (4) some problem appears, especially when our logic is not clas-
sical. For example, in intuitionistic logic, $\neg(p:p)$ and $pfp$ , where / is
an intuitionistic connective “...does not say, that...”, should not be
equivalent.1 Hence it is necessary to introduce the next “non-colon”
connective by additional axiom set.2 Neither intuitionistic non-identity
nor intuitionistic non-colon can be defined by means of implication $(\mathrm{c}.\mathrm{f}$.
[3] $)$ . A $\mathrm{b}\mathrm{a}s\mathrm{e}$ for these two dual to identity and colon connectives is coim-
plication defined by Rauszer (e.g. [4]). Thus, let us suppose that our
classical propositional language with colon and non-colon connectives
1It is analogous situation to, for example, the difference between the intuitionistic S4-possibi1ity
given by an $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}_{\mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}}}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$ from necessity set of axioms and possibility defined as $\neg\square \neg$ , with $\square$ - an
intuitionistic S4-necessity.
2A similar problem was considered in [3] for intuitionistic identity and intuitionistic non-identity.
The method used there for these two connectives will be repeated here for intuitionistic colon and
non-colon.
73










An additional inference rule is $\alpha\vdash\neg\sim\alpha$ . Still following [4], we will
say that our both intentional connectives are defined on the Heyting-
Brouwer logic ( $\mathrm{H}\mathrm{B}$-logic). Thus, assume that our CNC-language (lan-
guage with colon and non-colon) is an algebra
$\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{C}}=(\mathrm{L}_{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{C}}))\neg\sim,$ $\wedge,$ $\vee,$ $arrow,$ $rightarrow_{)}-)=:))\parallel)$
Analogously to the axiomatization of non-identity connective ([3]),
our new non-colon connective 1 is given by the following axioms
$(\mathrm{B}_{1})$ $\neg(\alpha/\alpha)$ .
$(\mathrm{B}_{2})$ $(\alpha\parallel\gamma)arrow((\alpha \mathit{1}\sqrt)\mathrm{v}(\beta \mathit{1}\gamma))$ ,
(B3) $\neg((\alpha\wedge\beta)\mathit{1}\alpha)$ ,
$(\mathrm{B}_{4})$ $\neg((\alpha\wedge\beta)\mathit{1}(\beta\wedge\alpha))$ ,
(B5) $\neg(\alpha \mathit{1}(\alpha\wedge\alpha))$ ,
$(\mathrm{B}_{6})$ $((\sim\alpha \mathit{1}^{\sim}\beta)\mathrm{v}(\sim\beta l\sim\alpha))arrow((\alpha’\sqrt)\mathrm{v}(\beta \mathit{1}^{\alpha))}$ ,
(B7) $((\alpha\S\gamma)/(\beta\S\delta))arrow((\alpha’\sqrt)\mathrm{v}(\gamma \mathit{1}\delta))$ for \S \in $\{\wedge,$ $\vee\}$ ,
$(\mathrm{B}_{8})$ $(((\alpha\S\gamma)/(\beta\S\delta))\mathrm{v}((\beta\S\delta)/(\alpha\S\gamma)))arrow((\alpha’\sqrt)\mathrm{v}(\beta \mathit{1}^{\alpha})\vee(\gamma f\delta)(\delta/\gamma))$
for \S \in $\{--, =, f\}$ ,
(B9) $(\alpha-\beta)arrow(\alpha \mathit{1}\sqrt)$ .
A definition of coequivalence is as follows, $\alpha^{\underline{arrow}}\beta=(\alpha-\beta)\mathrm{v}(\beta-\alpha)$ for
any $\alpha,\beta\in \mathrm{L}\mathrm{C}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{C}$ . We shall not provide any further formal analysis of
the meaning of these formulas considering them as simple ones.3 The
3The interpretation of axiom formulas for non-colon is especially easy in the light of two facts: 1.
$\alphaarrow\beta$ is a $\mathrm{H}\mathrm{B}$ -tautology, if and only if $\alpha-\beta$ is a $\mathrm{H}\mathrm{B}$-contratautology and 2. if $\alpha l\beta$ is
designated in the interpretation of the logic of falsehood, it means that $\alpha$ says that
$\beta$ .
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only axioms which need some comments are $(\mathrm{B}_{8})$ and partially $(\mathrm{B}_{6})$ .
Even when the colon connective is defined on the $\mathrm{H}\mathrm{B}$-logic, (A3) re-
mains in the $s$ame form, it means that \S can be neither coimplication,
coequivalence nor non-colon. Indeed, any extention of the formula (A3)
for the cases of \S \in $\{--,- arrow, f.\}$ violates even the most basic intuitions.
The same, $(\mathrm{A}_{6})$ cannot be repeated for the weak negation. A similar
situation is connected with axiom formulas for non-colon. Thus, the
non-colon as well as non-identity can and must be invariant only with
respect to all “Brouwerian” connectives (including them, of course),
i.e. the connectives which can be defined on the base of coimplication
thus, identity and colon are invariant only with respect to all connec-
tive$s$ defined by implication, which are called “Heyting” connectives in
thi$s$ paper.
Because of such kind of separation between two groups of connec-
tives, a semantics for logic with non-identity as well as for logic with
colon and coimplication needs as a base some algebraic construction
which would code this fact. In [3] there is presented such semantics for
Heyting-Brouwer logic with identity and non-identity. Now again we
can use that construction. Informally speaking, each model will be in
the form of two cones. One of them can be understood as a possible
space of the past. In a similar way, the other one will be connected with
the future. Thus, a “past” interpetation will be typical for Brouwerian
connectives (e.g. coimplication, coequivalence, weak negation, non-
colon), while Heyting connectives (implication, equivalence, negation,
colon) will be interpreted from the point of view of the future.
For formal presentation let us assume an algebra
$A=(\mathrm{A}, \neg, \sim, \cap, \cup, arrow, -, rightarrow, =, \triangleright, k)$
similar to the CNC-language.
For every $\mathrm{D}$ , a nonempty subset of $\mathrm{A}$ , let $\simeq$ be the relation of the
first kind i.e. a congruence of a matrix $\langle(\mathrm{A}, \neg, \cap, \cup, arrow, rightarrow, \triangleright). \mathrm{D}\rangle$ and
$\approx \mathrm{b}\mathrm{e}$ the relation of the second kind i.e. a congruence of (( $\mathrm{A},$ $\sim,$ $\cap,$ $\cup$ , –
$,$
$=,$ $k)\mathrm{D}\rangle$ .
Now we can consider two kinds of matrices




{ $(A../_{\approx},$ $\mathrm{D}./_{\approx}.\rangle$ : $\mathrm{D}\subset \mathrm{A}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\approx \mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}$ the relation of the
$\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{k}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}$
}.
A matrix of each kind can be rewriten as
$\mathrm{M}_{1}=\{\langle A_{x}, \mathrm{D}_{x}\rangle : x\in \mathrm{X}\}$ , $\mathrm{M}_{2}=\{.\langle A_{yy}, \mathrm{D}\rangle : y\in \mathrm{Y}\}$
where X and $\mathrm{Y}$ are sets of indexes of elements of $\mathrm{M}_{1}$ and $\mathrm{M}_{2}$ , respec-
tively. The relations $\leq \mathrm{x}$ and $\leq_{\mathrm{Y}}$ defined as
-for any $x_{1},$ $x_{2}\in \mathrm{X}x_{1}\leq_{\mathrm{X}^{X}2}$ iff $\mathrm{D}_{1}\subseteq \mathrm{D}_{2}$ , where $\mathrm{D}_{x_{\mathrm{i}}}=\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{i}}/\simeq_{\mathrm{i}}$ for $\mathrm{i}\in\{1,2\}$ ,
-for any $y_{1},$ $y_{2}\in \mathrm{Y}y_{1}\leq_{\mathrm{Y}y_{2}}$ iff $\mathrm{D}_{1}\subseteq \mathrm{D}_{2}$ , where $\mathrm{D}_{y_{\mathrm{i}}}=\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{i}}/\approx_{\mathrm{i}}$ for $\mathrm{i}\in\{1,2\}$
partially order sets X and $\mathrm{Y}$ , respectively.
Finally, we can define a HBcnc-model, i.e. a model for HBcnc-logic
( $\mathrm{H}\mathrm{B}$-logic with colon and non-colon given by $(\mathrm{A}_{1})-(\mathrm{A}_{9})$ and $(\mathrm{B}_{1})-(\mathrm{B}9)$ )
as such subset A4 of an element of $\mathrm{M}_{1}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{M}_{2}$ that for any $x\in \mathrm{X},$ $y\in \mathrm{Y}$
and $a,$ $b\in \mathrm{A}[a]_{z^{\cap}z}[b]Z=[b]z\mathrm{n}z[a]Z’[a]_{z^{\cap}z}[a]z=[a]_{z}$ and
(0) if $[a]_{z}\in \mathrm{D}_{z}$ , then $\forall t\geq_{\mathrm{Z}}z[a]_{t}\in \mathrm{D}_{t}$ ;
(1) $\neg[xa]_{x}\in \mathrm{D}_{x}$ if$f$ $\forall t\geq_{\mathrm{X}}x[a]_{t}\not\in \mathrm{D}_{t}$ ;
(2) $\sim_{y}[a]_{y}\in \mathrm{D}_{y}$ $iff$ $\exists t\leq_{\mathrm{Y}y}[a]_{t}\not\in \mathrm{D}_{t}$ ;
(3) $[a]_{z} \bigcap_{z}[b]_{z}\in \mathrm{D}_{z}$ $iff$ $[a]_{z}\in \mathrm{D}_{z}$ and $[b]_{z}\in \mathrm{D}_{z}$ ;
(4) $[a]_{Z^{\bigcup_{z}[b}}]z\in \mathrm{D}_{Z}$ if$f$ $[a]_{z}\in \mathrm{D}_{z}$ or $[b]_{z}\in \mathrm{D}_{z}$ ;
(5) $[a]_{x^{arrow}x}[b]_{x}\in \mathrm{D}_{x}$ $iff$ $\forall t\geq_{\mathrm{X}}X$ ( $[a]_{t}\not\in \mathrm{D}_{t}$ or $[b]_{t}\in \mathrm{D}_{t}$ );
(6) $[a]_{y^{-_{y}[}}b]y\in \mathrm{D}_{y}$ if $f$ $\exists t\leq_{\mathrm{Y}y}$ ( $[a]_{t}\in \mathrm{D}_{t}$ and $[b]_{t}\not\in \mathrm{D}_{t}$ );
(7) $[a]_{x}\triangleright_{x}[b]_{x}\in \mathrm{D}_{x}$ if $f$ $\forall t\geq_{\mathrm{X}}x\exists c\in \mathrm{A}_{t}[a]_{t}=[b]t\cap c$;
(8) $[a]_{y}\mu_{y}[b]_{y}\in \mathrm{D}_{y}$ $iff$ $\exists t\leq_{\mathrm{Y}y\forall c\in \mathrm{A}_{t}}[a]_{t}\neq[b]_{t^{\bigcap_{C}}}$ ,
with $(z, \mathrm{Z})=(x, \mathrm{X}),$ $(y, \mathrm{Y})$ .
The correctness of such construction bases on the fact that for any
$a\in \mathrm{A}$ and for any $x\in \mathrm{X}(y\in \mathrm{Y})$ there exist$sy\in \mathrm{Y}(x\in^{\mathrm{x})}$ such that $[a]_{x}\in \mathrm{D}_{x}$
is equivalent to $[a]_{y}\in \mathrm{D}_{y}$ .
A matrix-consequence is defined as follows: for any $\alpha\in \mathrm{L}_{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{C}}$ and for
any $\mathrm{B}\subseteq \mathrm{L}_{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{c},\alpha}\in \mathrm{C}\mathcal{M}(\mathrm{B})$ if and only if for any $\mathrm{h}\in \mathrm{H}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{L}\mathrm{C}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{c}, A)$ for any
$z\in \mathrm{z},$ $\mathrm{k}_{z}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{h}(\alpha)\in \mathrm{D}_{z}$ provided $\mathrm{k}_{z}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{h}(\beta)\in \mathrm{D}_{z}$ for all $\beta\in \mathrm{B}$ ; with $(z, \mathrm{Z})=(x, \mathrm{X})$ ,
$(y,\mathrm{Y})$ and $\mathrm{k}_{z}$ -a canonical homomorphism $A$ onto $A_{z}$ .
Now we can formulate a completeness theorem:
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Let $\alpha\in \mathrm{L}_{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{C}},$ $\mathrm{B}\subseteq \mathrm{L}_{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{C}}$ . The following conditions are equivalent
(a) $\alpha\in \mathrm{c}_{\mathrm{H}\mathrm{B}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}}(\mathrm{B})$,
(b) $\alpha\in \mathrm{C}_{\mathcal{M}}(\mathrm{B})$ for any HBcnc-model $\mathcal{M}$ .
Similarly to the case of the colon connective, a soundness of the
above theorem above $\mathrm{b}\mathrm{a}s$es on the same fact as in the classical case and,
moreover, on the fact that $\mathrm{k}_{z}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{h}((\alpha/\sqrt)\vee(\beta f\alpha))\not\in \mathrm{D}_{Z}$ implies $\mathrm{k}_{t}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{h}(\alpha)=$
$\mathrm{k}_{t^{\mathrm{O}}}\mathrm{h}(\beta)$ for any $t\leq z$ . Indeed, assume that $\mathrm{k}_{z}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{h}((\alpha f\sqrt)\mathrm{v}(\beta f\alpha))\not\in \mathrm{D}z$’
it means that $\mathrm{k}_{z}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{h}(\alpha \mathit{1}\beta)\not\in \mathrm{D}z$ and $\mathrm{k}_{z}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{h}(\beta/\alpha)\not\in \mathrm{D}_{z}$. Thus for any $t\leq z$ ,
$\mathrm{k}_{z}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{h}(\alpha)=\mathrm{k}_{z}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{h}(\sqrt)\bigcap_{C}$ and $\mathrm{k}_{z}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{h}(\beta)=\mathrm{k}z^{\mathrm{O}}\mathrm{h}(\alpha)\mathrm{n}d$ for some $c,$ $d\in \mathrm{A}_{t}$ . Re-
peating an appropriate procedure as for the case of colon connective,
finally we arrive at $\mathrm{k}_{t}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{h}(\alpha)=\mathrm{k}_{t^{\mathrm{o}\mathrm{h}}}(\sqrt)$ for any $t\leq z$ .
For the completeness let us construct a model using prime HBcnc-
theories and their complementation$s$ . Obviously, $\mathrm{T}$ is a prime HBcnc-
theory if and only if $\overline{\mathrm{T}}$ is a prime $\mathrm{H}^{-}\mathrm{B}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}$-theory $(\mathrm{c}.\mathrm{f}. [4])$ .4 From this
moment “$\mathrm{T}$” will be a symbol only for prime HBcnc-theory as wel as
“$\overline{\mathrm{T}}$” for prime $\mathrm{H}^{-}\mathrm{B}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}$-theory being a complementation of T. Relations
of the first and second kind are defined, respectively, as follows
$\alpha\simeq\beta$ iff $\alpharightarrow\beta\in \mathrm{T}$ $\alpha\approx\beta$ iff $\alpha=\sqrt\not\in \mathrm{T}$ .
The fact that both relations are appropriate partial congruences follow$s$
bom $(\mathrm{A}_{6})-(\mathrm{A}\mathfrak{g})$ and $(\mathrm{B}_{6})-(\mathrm{B}_{9})$ . Now, let us construct two kinds of
matrices
$\mathrm{M}_{1}=\langle \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{C}}/\simeq’ \mathrm{T}/\simeq\rangle$ , $\mathrm{M}_{2}=\langle \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{C}}/\approx)\mathrm{T}/\approx\rangle$ .
Indexes X and $\mathrm{Y}$ as well as partial orders $\leq \mathrm{x}$ and $\leq_{\mathrm{Y}}$ are introduced
in the same way like for quotient algebras considered above. A verifi-
cation that $\mathrm{M}_{1}\cup \mathrm{M}_{2}$ satisfies the conditions (0)$-(6)$ of the HBcnc-model
is standard. (7) is checked similarly to the classical case. We will show
the last condition, only. Assume that $[\alpha]_{\approx}f_{\approx}[\beta]_{\approx}\not\in \mathrm{T}_{\approx}$ , i.e. $(\alpha’\beta)\in\overline{\mathrm{T}}$ .
Because $\alphaarrow\beta$ is a HBcnc-tautology if and only if $\alpha-\beta$ is a $\mathrm{H}^{-}\mathrm{B}\mathrm{C}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{C}-$
tautology (see [4]), using Modus Tollens-an inference rule for $\mathrm{H}^{-}\mathrm{B}_{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{C}}-$
logic $(\alpha-\beta,\beta\vdash\alpha)$ , by $(\mathrm{B}_{1})$ and (B7) $(\alpha\wedge\alpha)/(\alpha\wedge\beta)\in\overline{\mathrm{T}}$ . From $(\mathrm{B}_{2})$
and (B5), $\alpha f(\alpha\wedge\beta)\in\overline{\mathrm{T}}$ and because of (B3), $[\alpha]_{\approx^{=}}[\alpha]\approx\cap[\beta]\approx$ . A proof
4According to the notation from [4], “bar” over some $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{b}_{\mathrm{o}1}$ means an object from the logic of
falsehood dual to HBcnc-logic.
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of this implication completes fact that $(\alpha f\sqrt)\in\overline{\mathrm{T}}’$ for any $\overline{\mathrm{T}}’\supseteq\overline{\mathrm{T}}$ . Now,
let for any $\mathrm{T}’\supseteq \mathrm{T}$ there exi$s\mathrm{t}\mathrm{s}\gamma$ such that $[\alpha]_{\approx^{=}}[\beta]_{\approx}\cap[\gamma]_{\approx}$ . lt means
that $\alpha f(\beta\wedge\gamma)\in\overline{\mathrm{T}}.\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}$ some $\gamma$ . Finally, by $(\mathrm{B}_{2})$. and
$(\mathrm{B}_{3}),$ $(\alpha’\sqrt)\not\in \mathrm{T}$ . $\square$
3 Modal associations
In [3] there are settled some relations between connectives formed
in two pairs: identity with $\mathrm{S}4$-necessity and non-identity with S4-
possibihity-all of them are intuitionistic. However, on the base of logic
with colon and non-colon, it is possible to establish similar relations
between these new connectives and the both S4-moda1ities. Thus, the
“necessary” part of intuitionistic S4 can be embedded into intuitionis-
tic logic with colon. Indeed, an $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}s\mathrm{y}$ verification shows that basing on
the formulas $(\mathrm{A}_{1})-(\mathrm{A}_{9})$ , by the translation: for any $\alpha\in \mathrm{L}_{\mathrm{C}}$
$.$
for some tautology $\mathrm{T}$ , there can be derived all axioms for S4-necessity
$($ $\alphaarrow\alpha$
$($ $\square \alphaarrow\square \square \alpha$
$($ $\square (\alphaarrow\beta)arrow(\square \alphaarrow\square \beta)$
as well as the rule of necessity. Opposite definability, however, does not
hold. Only appropriate extention of intuitionism with colon is equiv-
alent to “necessary” part of intuitionistic S4. If $\mathrm{C}$ is an intuitionistic
consequence operation, then desired extention is of the form
$\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{C}}(\{\alpha:\beta|\alphaarrow\beta\in \mathrm{C}(\emptyset)\})$ .
The second lacking translation for proving the mentioned equivalence
is
$\alpha:\beta=$
for any $\alpha,\beta\in \mathrm{L}_{\mathrm{C}}$ .





and the rule of possibility (i.e. $\neg\alpha\vdash\neg \mathrm{O}\alpha$ ), are settled by two transla-
tions
$\alpha f\sqrt=\mathrm{O}(\alpha-\beta)$ , $\mathrm{O}\alpha=\alpha f\perp$ , for $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{y}\perp$ .
Similarly to the previous case, a “possibility” part of intuitionistic S4
can be embedded into the intuitionistic logic with non-colon, by the
second given above translation. An axiomatic extention of $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{H}\mathrm{B}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}}$ (a
$\mathrm{H}\mathrm{B}$-logic with non-colon) is as follows
$\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{H}\mathrm{B}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}}(\{\neg(\alpha \mathit{1}.\sqrt)|\neg(\alpha-\beta)\in \mathrm{c}_{\mathrm{H}}\mathrm{B}(\emptyset)\})$ .
As for idenitity, even replacement of (03) by formula $(\mathrm{O}\alpha\vee\theta\beta)arrow$
$\mathrm{O}(\alpha\vee\beta)^{5}$ does not yield the equivalence between intuitionistic colon and
intuitionistic S4-possibi1ity. On the base of intuitionistic logic (also, on
the $\mathrm{H}\mathrm{B}$-logic), a Brouwerian connective cannot be defined by Heyting
one.
Of course, on the base of classical logic, every couple of translations
can be mutually defined by one other.
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